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ABSTRACT
After a brief introduction, this paper comprises the text of a submission to
the House of Reprentatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Affairs for its inquiry into greater autonomy for 'the people
of the Torres Strait'. The paper distinguishes between the political and
economic dimensions of greater autonomy and discusses each in turn.
Under political autonomy, it discusses current representative structures in
the Torres Strait region and their possible future restructuring into a more
fully-fledged form of regional government. Under economic autonomy, it
examines major resource and financial flows to and from the Torres Strait
region and the current pattern of control and influence over these flows. It
suggests some possibility for renegotiating this pattern of control and
influence under a future regional government. The final section of the
paper identifies comparative models of self-government drawn from the
Australian external territories and from international experience. It suggests
that, while these may provide useful ideas for Torres Strait, they will not
provide ready-made solutions. It also suggests that Torres Strait will not
become a precedent for other developments towards greater Indigenous
group autonomy elsewhere in Australia, although Torres Strait, too, may
provide ideas for other Indigenous groups in other areas. The paper
concludes that it should be possible to satisfy expressed desires for a
greater degree of autonomy in Torres Strait, but that to advance the process
much further will probably require a constitutional convention of interested
constituencies.
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In recent years, several calls have been made for the restructuring of
government institutions relating to Torres Strait Islanders and the Torres
Strait. Partly in response to these calls, a Torres Strait Regional Authority
(TSRA) was established in 1994 as an enhanced regional council within
the Commonwealth-created Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC). Members of the TSRA soon, however, made it
known that they saw the new authority as a 'transitional arrangement
providing a basis for a progressive negotiated movement towards
greater regional autonomy in the delivery of programs and services' (TSRA
1994a: 3).
In July 1996, the chairperson of the TSRA, Getano Lui (Jnr), met with the
Prime Minister, John Howard, in Canberra to discuss the next steps in this
progressive negotiated movement. He called for a 'single line
appropriation' for the TSRA direct from the Commonwealth Department of
Finance, rather than through ATSIC, and for a Commonwealth/State task
force to examine the possibility of Torres Strait self-government, hopefully
by the year 2000 (The Canberra Times, 16 July 1996).
While the Howard Government did not establish such a Commonwealth/
State task force, a month after the meeting with Lui the Minister for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, Senator John Herron, did
refer the issue of Torres Strait autonomy to the House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs
(HRSCATSIA). The terms of reference for the committee were to:
Inquire into and report on:
i Whether the people of the Torres Strait would benefit from a greater degree of
autonomy;
ii If so, what forms should a greater degree of autonomy take; and
iii What implications would greater autonomy have for Torres Strait Islanders
resident outside the Torres Strait region including whether the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission or the Torres Strait Regional Authority
should represent the interests of such residents (HRSCATSIA 1996: 1).
The most crucial words in these terms of reference are those identifying the
subjects of a possible greater degree of autonomy, 'the people of the Torres
Strait'. This phrase can be interpreted both racially/ethnically and
geographically. If interpreted racially/ethnically, 'the people of the Torres
Strait' can be taken to refer to Torres Strait Islanders. If interpreted
geographically, 'the people of the Torres Strait' can be taken to refer to
long-term residents of the Torres Strait, whether Torres Strait Islander or
not.
The following is the text of a submission made to the HRSCATSIA based
on an interpretation of the phrase 'the people of the Torres Strait' which
combines both geographic and ethnic elements. It assumes that the greater
degree of autonomy being talked about relates primarily to people resident
in the Torres Strait region. However, the third term of reference clearly
requires that the position of Torres Strait Islanders resident outside the
Strait be taken into account in thinking about moves towards a greater
degree of autonomy for the Torres Strait region. This introduces a clear
racial/ethnic aspect to the inquiry's key phrase, 'the people of the Torres
Strait'. We have taken 'the people of Torres Strait' to mean all long-term
residents of the Torres Strait, whether Torres Strait Islander or not, and all
Torres Strait Islanders, whether resident in the Strait or not, but with the
emphasis being primarily on regional autonomy.
Since writing this submission and this discussion paper, we have become
aware that others are interpreting the terms of reference for the inquiry
somewhat differently. They are focusing on autonomy for Torres Strait
Islanders as a racial/ethnic group. They have seen the inquiry as an
appropriate forum in which to make calls for a separation of Torres Strait
Islander concerns, nationwide, from Aboriginal concerns. One idea with
some currency has been to establish a separate Torres Strait Islander
Commission, to take the TSI' out of ATSIC as it has been catchily put.
This interpretation of the terms of reference raises important but different
issues from those discussed here. It will be the subject of a subsequent
submission to the HRSCATSIA and a CAEPR Discussion Paper. At this
stage, however, we thought it best to publish our original submission
virtually unchanged.
Submission
The first two terms of reference from the Minister ask the HRSCATSIA to
inquire into and report on 'whether the people of the Torres Strait would
benefit from a greater degree of autonomy' and 'if so, what forms should a
greater degree of autonomy take' (HRSCATSIA 1996: 1). The issue of
benefit is a strange place to begin. Benefit will depend to a large extent on
the form of greater autonomy devised and so at this stage must be largely
unknown. What is known is that a number of calls for greater autonomy
have been made by various people and organisations in Torres Strait over
recent years in response to dissatisfaction with past and current
institutional arrangements for the region. There is something of a desire in
the Strait to explore possibilities for greater autonomy. Responding to and
meeting this expressed desire would be the first benefit of devising a
greater form of autonomy. Other benefits should, if the new form of
autonomy is well devised, also follow. We believe it is problematic,
therefore, to focus at the outset on benefits. We start with expressed desires
for greater autonomy and see the challenge as devising a form of greater
autonomy which will be of benefit to the people of Torres Strait, as well as
being acceptable to the larger Australian community.
We begin by suggesting that it may be useful to distinguish analytically
between greater political autonomy, meaning some revised and enhanced
form of self-government for Torres Strait, and greater economic autonomy,
meaning greater control and influence over important economic resources
both within and flowing to and from the region. These two dimensions of
greater autonomy may be linked and developed together, but equally they
may not (Arthur 1990: 1).
It should also be noted that this is a condensed discussion built in part on
earlier work. Although we hope it makes sense in its own right, it would
perhaps be better read in conjunction with our earlier works, to which
reference is made throughout this submission.
Greater political autonomy
Greater political autonomy can generally be taken to mean some
significant changes in the current governance structures of Torres Strait. In
theory, these could range from achieving the status of a full independent
nation state, alongside Australia, within the international community, to
some slightly amended form of the current governance structures for the
Torres Strait region within the Australian nation state. Some support may
be found in the Strait for a number of differing positions along this
continuum. Our sense is that the general body of Strait opinion will
probably favour a fairly significant strengthening of the existing structures
of regional governance within the Strait without seeking a move to full
independent statehood within the international community. This
intermediate ground may, perhaps, be referred to as the development of
regional self-government; even within this terminology, however, there are
large areas for debate and many different possibilities.
To understand future prospects for regional self-government in Torres
Strait, it is first necessary to understand the current structures of local and
regional political representation in the area. Sanders (1994, 1995) has
outlined elsewhere the history and current status of the 18 local and two
regional structures of political representation in the Strait. In summary,
these structures are as follows.
Seventeen of the 18 local government structures in Torres Strait are Island
Councils incorporated under the Queensland Community Services (Torres
Strait) Act 1984. Holding office on these councils is restricted to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who have lived in the area for
not less than two years. Voting, however, is open to all residents of the
area who meet the standard Queensland Local Government Act 1993
criteria. As 14 of these Island Councils operate in the outer islands and two
operate in the Cape York Islander communities, where there are few
residents who do not identify as either Torres Strait Islander or Aboriginal,
the number of residents who can vote, but not hold office in these Island
Councils, is probably very few (see Table 1 for 1991 Census population
figures for the region and sub-regions within it).
Table 1. Sell-identified population of Torres Strait region, 1991
Census.
Sub-region/region
self-identification Number
Per cent of sub-
regional/regional
population
Sub-regional
percentage of total
regional population
Inner Islands
Islanders
Aborigines
Others
Sub-total
Outer Islands
Islanders
Aborigines
Others
Sub-total
Cape Islander communities
Islanders
Aborigines
Others
Sub-total
2,001
123
1,332
3,456
2,792
60
168
3,020
604
34
138
776
58
4
39
100
92
2
6
100
78
4
18
100
48
42
11
Total Torres Strait region
Islanders
Aborigines
Others
Total
5,397
217
1,638
7,252
74
3
23
100 100
Source: Sanders (1994, 1995).
The eighteenth local government structure is the Torres Shire Council
(TSC), in which both office holding and voting rights are open to all
residents who meet standard Queensland Local Government Act 1993
criteria. Theoretically, the land and residential area of the TSC covers all
the islands of the Strait plus Cape York down to 11 degrees. However,
through the concurrent operation within this area of the Community
Services (Torres Strait) Act 1984 and the Community Services (Aborigines)
Act 1984, the TSC is effectively restricted to being a local government for
Thursday, Horn and Prince of Wales Islands in the inner Torres Strait
Islands group. This is because the 17 Island Councils (and three Aboriginal
Councils) within the larger theoretical TSC area are given the functions of
local governments within their areas and also because residents in these
areas who vote for the Island (and Aboriginal) Councils are not allowed to
vote for the TSC (see Sanders 1994, 1995 for a more extensive
discussion).1
At the regional level, there are two structures of political representation for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, but effectively none, beyond
the TSC, for other residents. The chairpersons of the 17 Island Councils
come together as the Island Coordinating Council (ICC), also established
under the Queensland Community Services (Torres Strait) Act 1984. The
ICC has an additional member elected by Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander residents of Tamwoy and other areas on the northern half of
Thursday Island. The TSRA, established under the Commonwealth
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Act 1993,
comprises all these ICC members plus two other Aboriginal or Torres
Strait Islander representatives; one of these is drawn from the southern Port
Kennedy area of Thursday Island and the other from Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander residents of Horn and Prince of Wales Islands combined.
Sanders suggests that one of the key issues in moving towards regional
self-government for Torres Strait will be the precise constituency to which
any new structure is directed. The present arrangements combine
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander-specific constituencies for the Island
Councils, the ICC and the TSRA with a more general residential
constituency for the TSC.2 This hybrid arrangement works quite well as a
way of accommodating different interests in the Strait, but probably needs
to be built on and developed in the process of working towards greater
political autonomy for the region.
One of the difficulties of the present arrangement is that the two structures
of regional political representation in Torres Strait are Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander-specific. While this enhances their ability to speak
strongly for the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander interests in the
region, it also limits their ability to present themselves as fully-fledged
regional representative structures. To do this, they would need to
accommodate and represent the other non-Indigenous population of the
Strait, currently accommodated at the local level within the TSC. In the
more populated inner islands of the Strait, the proportion of people not
identifying as either Islander or Aboriginal rises to around 40 per cent (see
Table 1). This is a significant number, some of whom would probably
resist any move to fuller regional self-government unless they felt
represented within it. Sanders (1994, 1995) has suggested that to overcome
this problem the TSC and the Island Councils, or close derivatives of them,
could come together in some new confederal regional government
structure. The constituency of this confederal regional government would
include all long-term residents in the Torres Strait region; there would,
however, still be future debates about who could qualify for inclusion in
the constituency and how the representation of various parts of the
confederation might be balanced (see Sanders 1994, 1995).
One implication of such a broadening of the constituency of the regional
structures of political representation within Torres Strait would be, as
Sanders notes, that these structures would probably need to move outside
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander-specific ATSIC structure. This
does not, however, mean that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders within
the Torres Strait region could not maintain representation within ATSIC.
Sanders suggests a likely way forward would be for the Queensland and
Commonwealth Parliaments to pass complementary legislation focusing
specifically on regional governance structures for Torres Strait. This might
be framed, for example, as Torres Strait Regional Government
Constitution legislation. Changes to the ATSIC legislation would probably
follow from, but be quite separate to, this new legislation.
Sanders' earlier papers pay relatively little attention to a third constituency
which has a considerable interest in any move towards greater political
autonomy for Torres Strait and which is mentioned specifically in the
standing committee's third term of reference. This constituency is Torres
Strait Islanders currently residing outside Torres Strait. The 1991 Census
enumerated some 21,200 such Torres Strait Islanders, significantly
outnumbering the 5,680 that were counted in the Torres Strait (Taylor and
Arthur 1992; Arthur and Taylor 1994). This constituency has a range of
interests in greater political autonomy for Torres Strait which could be
addressed in a number of different ways.
One obvious interest of these non-resident Torres Strait Islanders is likely
to be preserving some right of return to Torres Strait. It is also possible that
they would like some ongoing input to the governance of their homeland
while absent from it. It is interesting in this regard that the 1994 National
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey suggested a strong sense of
attachment to their homeland among Islanders residing outside the Strait
(Arthur 1996). How these desires for a right of return, and also for some
ongoing involvement in the governance of the region while absent, might
be accommodated raises important questions.
One possibility is that non-resident Torres Strait Islanders could be given
some form of representation within the Torres Strait regional government.
They could, for example, retain some right to vote in their Island Council
or TSC election while absent for certain periods, just as Australiansabsent
overseas retain some right to vote in Commonwealth and State elections. If
such votes were of equal value to those of residents and large numbers of
non-resident Torres Strait Islanders were given such rights, there may be
potential for resident Islanders to feel that non-resident had too much
influence and voting power, given their relative numbers. This could be
handled in several ways. The value of non-residents votes could in some
way be reduced or the numbers of non-residents who qualified to vote in
some way restricted. Alternatively, a separate electoral division or
divisions within the confederal regional government structure could be set
aside for non-resident Torres Strait Islanders, in which case their voting
power within the regional government structure would be determined by
the number of divisions allocated to them.
The previously mentioned possible Queensland and Commonwealth Torres
Strait Regional Government Constitution legislation could play a
significant role in laying down some of these basic institutional
arrangements for Torres Strait regional government and entrenching them
at a higher level than the ordinary law of regional government. Substantive
rights, such as the right of return of non-resident Torres Strait Islanders,
could also be constitutionally specified. However, before that stage is
reached, some broad constitutional development process needs to be
engaged in by all the constituencies with an interest in the possibility of
Torres Strait regional government. We would argue that something like a
Torres Strait regional government constitutional convention needs to be
convened. Only then can the range of possible alternatives for Torres Strait
regional government be aired and understandings reached about what
might and might not be acceptable to various members of the three
interested constituencies.
Besides constituency and confederal representation, Sanders (1994, 1995)
identifies two other key issues in moving towards greater regional self-
government for Torres Strait. These are the marine environment and the
role of other government authorities in Torres Strait.3 The role of other
government authorities in relation to a proposed regional government is a
potentially vast area for negotiation, ranging over subject areas as diverse
as health and education, policing, customs, quarantine and immigration,
social security and tax, fisheries and the marine environment. One group of
these subject areas, customs, quarantine and immigration, relates to Torres
Strait's position as an international border region, which the committee
identifies in its Inquiry Information as a possible 'major issue'
(HRSCATSIA 1996: 7). We would agree that this is a significant issue, but
would argue that being a border region does not present insurmountable
problems for moving towards greater political autonomy.4 The marine
environment is a particularly important issue because Torres Strait
Islanders view it as the very basis of their culture and also as perhaps
offering the best resource base for future regional economic development
(Arthur 1990; Mulrennan and Hanssen 1994). Other areas, such as social
security and tax, are of importance because of their current contribution to
fiscal flows in the region. In all these areas there is considerable potential
for renegotiation of current understandings and arrangements as part of a
move towards greater political autonomy. Equally, however, there may be
subject areas in which regional self-government ends up substantially
endorsing current arrangements.
The TSRA has already indicated that, as part of the move towards greater
political autonomy for the Strait, it is seeking 'devolution' or 'greater local
control and authority over decision making' in many of these substantive
areas in which other government authorities operate (TSRA 1994b: 3).
Sanders (1994, 1995) argues, however, that new arrangements and
understandings in these subject areas do not need to be finalised before
regional government can proceed. These are matters which a regional
government could pursue over time, rather than ones that need to be settled
at the outset. Clearly, however, new arrangements and understandings in
these areas could involve substantial changes in the control of and
influence over financial and economic resources both within and flowing
to and from Torres Strait. This relates to our second dimension of greater
autonomy, greater economic autonomy.
Greater economic autonomy
In common with many remote regions, the Torres Strait economy is
characterised by a narrow industry base and a sizeable public services
sector. The private sector industry base is restricted to fishing, tourism and
a limited number of service industries such as retailing, banking and
transport. The public sector generally reflects a fairly full range of services.
We will attempt to identify some of the major financial and economic
flows within these two sectors for the region.
Arthur (1990) calculated that in 1989-90 Queensland government
expenditure in the region amounted to some $24 million, of which at least
$7 million was on capital items (see Table 2). Major items within the non-
capital expenditure category were $5.6 million in education salaries, $2.4
million in hospital salaries and $2.0 million in salaries from the then
Department of Community Services and the Island Industries Board.5
Arthur also identified $5.2 million in State government income from the
region, of which $3.1 million was hospital income and $1.3 million
electricity charges. This does not include State government taxes.
Although Queensland government expenditure in the region in recent years
may not be precisely as in 1989-90, particularly on capital items, these
figures are at least indicative. It should also be noted that the ICC is
presently consulted about much of this expenditure, but ultimate control
rests with individual Queensland government agencies.
Arthur (1990) calculated that in 1989-90 Commonwealth government
agencies, excluding the then Department of Aboriginal Affairs (now
ATSIC and the TSRA), expended $21m in Torres Strait (see Table 2). The
largest items were $7m in Department of Employment, Education and
Training program expenditure and $6m in Department of Social Security
payments. Within the remainder significant expenditures were $3m in
defence, $1.2m in fisheries, $0.9m in telecommunications and $0.6 million
in postal services. Income derived from the region amounted to $4.4
million, including $2.9 million in telecommunications charges and $0.8
million in postal charges. Again, this does not include tax income and even
though these figures are for 1989-90, they are at least indicative. It is likely
that the TSRA is increasingly consulted about much Commonwealth
expenditure, but as with State agencies ultimate control remains with
individual Commonwealth agencies.
Table 2. Principal fiscal flows of the Torres Strait public services
sector.
Expenditure Income
Administration $ million $ million
State government (1989-90)3 24.0 5.4
Commonwealth government (1989-90)b 21.0 4.4
Commonwealth, TSRA (1994-95)c 24.5 1.0
Torres Shire Council (1993-94)d 3.8 1.6
a. Arthur (1990: 82, 26) and O'Rourke (1988).
b. Department of Aboriginal Affairs expenditure is excluded to avoid double counting as TSRA
expenditure is separately identified. 1989-90 data from Arthur (1990: 81, 29).
c. TSRA (1995: 31, 33, 41,42, 62).
d. Australian Bureau of Statistics (1995: 11, 15).
The TSRA, established in 1994, currently has an annual expenditure in the
region of $24.5 million (see Table 2). Major items include $14 million on
the 'work-for-the-dole' Community Development Employment Projects
(CDEP) scheme, $1.6 million on community infrastructure and housing
and $0.9 million on local government funding allocations to Island
Councils. The TSRA currently derives own source income amounting to
$1.0 million from property rents and interest (TSRA 1995). At present
most funds come to the TSRA from the Commonwealth via the ATSIC
budgetary process. However, it has already been suggested that, as part of
the pursuit of greater autonomy, funding may be separated from ATSIC
from 1997-98 and be negotiated directly with the Department of Finance
(Courier Mail, 17 July 1996). The TSC currently expends $3.8 million in
the region, $1.6 million of which is derived from local rates and service
charges (see Table 2).
Fishing is the largest industry in Torres Strait. Altman, Arthur and Bek
(1994) calculated a value, to the fishers, of $26.7 million in 1992. The
largest component was $20.5 million in the prawn fishery which is carried
out entirely by fishers from outside Torres Strait. Thus, although prawns
are a significant regional export, income to the region from the prawn
fishery is virtually nil. This may be contrasted with the lobster fishery,
value $4.5 million, and the trochus shell fishery, value $0.4 million, which
return significant income to fishers in the region. Altman, Arthur and Bek
(1994) estimated that the potential value of Torres Strait commercial
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fisheries may be up to $40 million, with a possible increase in utilisation
being primarily in the lobster fishery.
The current regulation of fisheries in Torres Strait is shared between
the Commonwealth and Queensland governments. Commonwealth
involvement derives in part from obligations under the Torres Strait Treaty
signed between Australia and Papua New Guinea and the establishment
under that treaty of a Torres Strait 'protected zone'. The Torres Strait
Protected Zone Joint Authority (TSPZJA), comprising the relevant
Commonwealth and Queensland ministers, oversees much fisheries
management in the area. The TSPZJA has management, consultative and
advisory committees, as well as more specific working groups, on which
the ICC, and hence TSRA, have representation. Ultimate authority,
however, rests with the joint authority and the Queensland and
Commonwealth ministers. The TSPZJA expended $3.2 million in the
region in 1993-94 (TSPZJA 1994). This expenditure may be partially
offset by income from licensing, but we were unable to ascertain the extent
of such income.
Altman (1995: 8) estimated the value of tourism at the Seisia community
on the tip of Cape York in 1994 to be $0.87 million. This accrued to a
number of small private enterprises, many of which made lease or rent
payments to Seisia Island Council. There are, to our knowledge, no figures
available on the value of tourism elsewhere in Torres Strait. However,
there is also a small tourism industry established on Thursday Island. There
is arguably potential for further development of tourism in Torres Strait
(Emery et al. 1996). But there are also significant obstacles. Competing
with other tourism destinations in North Queensland may be difficult and
fresh water supplies in the Strait are limited. Also, Islanders, at this stage,
appear to have limited interest in being involved in areas of comparative/
competitive advantage, such as cultural aspects of tourism (Arthur 1990;
Altman 1995).
Arthur (1990: 91) estimated retail turnover in the region in 1986 to be in
the order of $20 million. The retail industry presently comprises stores
operated by the Islander Board of Industry Services and some private
retailers. Shipping turnover in the region was estimated at $7.5 million for
1989 and air transport between the outer and inner islands at $2 million
(Arthur 1990: 91).
There are clearly numerous significant economic and fiscal flows both
within, and to and from, the Torres Strait region. Control and influence
over these flows is diverse, being shared between industry operators and a
large number of public sector authorities. Patterns of control and influence
could be significantly renegotiated as part of a move towards regional self-
government, with local representative structures assuming greater roles
than at present. However, the TSRA has recently suggested that 'whatever
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form of self-government is finally determined' it envisages 'continuing
responsibility for a range of matters' by the Queensland and
Commonwealth governments (TSRA 1995: 22). This, along with the
mixed public/private nature of the regional economy, suggests that some
significant diversity of control and influence over economic flows will
remain.
Another significant avenue for renegotiation of control and influence over
resources and economic flows in the region may develop through native
title processes. There are at present over 60 registered claims for
determination of native title in Torres Strait, covering both land and marine
aspects. How these might progress, alongside moves towards regional self-
government and the operation of the Torres Strait Treaty, is at this stage
largely unknown. However, any future determination which recognised
Islander property rights in marine resources would certainly be a
significant development.
Comparison and precedent
The committee states in its Inquiry Information (HRSCATSIA 1996) that,
while it has no wish to pre-determine views, there are a number of issues
which are likely to arise. Two of these, comparison and precedent, which
we have not previously mentioned, warrant some discussion.
The committee suggests that, while Torres Strait is 'working towards a
unique form of self-government', it might also be useful to consider
comparative 'international models for self-determination of indigenous
people' (HRSCATSIA 1996: 8). The models which have been mentioned
most frequently in recent years by Torres Strait Islanders as potential
comparisons have not been international, but Australian external territories
models, particularly Norfolk, Christmas and Cocos-Keeling Islands (see,
for example, Lui 1994: 70).
Unlike Torres Strait, none of these Australian external territories models
deal with a situation in which one group within the resident population has
a clear claim to being Indigenous. However, all three do deal with
ethnically-diverse local populations resulting from the last couple of
hundred years of settlement. In this sense they may be quite good models
from which Torres Strait can draw a sense of possibility and optimism
about its own exercise in accommodating diverse ethnic interests. Norfolk
Island, for example, which has been substantially self-governing within the
Australian nation state since 1979, has attempted to ensure the ongoing
rights of descendants of the Pitcairn Islanders, while at the same time
accommodating a population of more recent settlers.
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The Australian external territories models encompass a variety of
arrangements concerning the applicability of Commonwealth and State
laws (see House of Representative Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs 1991). They also encompass a variety of
arrangements relating to standards of service and fiscal capacity. The
Commonwealth Grants Commission (1993, 1995) has already done
extensive work on service standards and fiscal capacities in some of these
territories in comparison to other remote Australian localities. If
ministerially requested, the Commission could undertake a similar exercise
for Torres Strait. There is clearly much that can drawn on from
arrangements for these external territories (Fletcher 1992).
One international example which might also be relevant in an indirect way
is the relationship between New Zealand and the Cook Islands, even
though the Cook Islands are closer to an independent nation state than
Torres Strait is likely to become. One relevant aspect of this example is
that it involves a population of Cook Islanders resident in New Zealand
which greatly outnumbers the resident population in the Cook Islands, that
is 37,000 to 18,000 (see Henderson 1994). The desire of these absent
Cook Islanders to have some say in the ongoing governance of their
homeland has been accommodated by allocating one seat to them in the
Cook Islands' 25-member Legislative Assembly. Another relevant aspect
of the Cook Islands model is that it attempts to balance representation
between a central island group, accounting for about half the population,
and numerous outer islands with a large range of far lesser populations
(Larmour 1985). The Cook Islands case also, however, demonstrates that
tensions can arise when autonomy in taxing leads small self-governing
jurisdictions to become tax havens in relation to the larger jurisdictions
with which they are associated (see Henderson 1994).
One other international example which might be of some relevance is
Nunavut in northern Canada. There, a new form of regional self-
government will come into effect in 1999, involving a population of
approximately 18,000 of which 80-85 per cent are Indigenous Inuit. The
new public governance structure was negotiated over a period of 20 years
alongside a land claims settlement process which ensured control over
large portions of Nunavut land for the Inuit (see Okalik 1995). This may
suggest how native title issues in Torres Strait may be addressed in tandem
with regional self-government issues. It may also suggest likely time scales
required for moves in these directions.
There is, clearly, an array of both domestic and international comparative
experience which could be drawn on in devising workable arrangements
for greater political and economic autonomy for Torres Strait. However,
comparative experience will not provide ready-made solutions for Torres
Strait.
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On the issue of precedent, the committee notes that Torres Strait Islanders
rely on their unique culture and unbroken relationship with their islands
and sea as the basis for their claims for self-determination' and then goes
on to wonder whether this 'would be seen as a precedent for other distinct
and homogenous groups' (HRSCATSIA 1996: 7). There seems no doubt
that the Torres Strait experience may be looked to by other regions of
Australia attempting to balance Indigenous and non-Indigenous interests.
The use of the term precedent may, however, be somewhat too strong,
implying some strict legal patterning. The relationship between
developments in the Torres Strait and those in other regions of Australia is
likely to be looser than this. Torres Strait regional government will become
an example to be drawn on for ideas, rather than a strict precedent; just as
some of the domestic and international comparative examples mentioned
above are being drawn on for the Torres Strait.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion suggests that expressed desires for greater
autonomy in Torres Strait should be able to be satisfied by some form of
regional self-government within the Australian nation state. We have
identified a number of issues which will need to be addressed and debated
in devising such regional self-government. Without being prescriptive, we
have suggested some possible ways forward and noted that none of these
issues appear to be insurmountable. We have foreshadowed the possibility
of some close derivatives of the existing Island Councils and the TSC
coming together as a confederal regional government based on
complementary Torres Strait Regional Government legislation passed by
the Commonwealth and Queensland parliaments. However, we have also
suggested that to advance the process of devising an appropriate form of
regional self-government there will need to be a constitutional convention
of interested constituencies.
Notes
1. TSC does take on some local government responsibilities on the tip of Cape
York outside the two Island Council and three Aboriginal Council areas north of
11 degrees; for example, it takes some responsibility for roads in this area.
2. The word 'effectively' is added to allude to the fact that technically all residents
in Island Council areas can vote, although only Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people can hold office.
3. The marine environment is not separately identified as a key issue in Sanders
(1994). This is one of the few changes between these two similarly titled pieces.
4. For a description of some of the issues relating to the cross-border relationship
see Arthur (1992) and Davis (1995).
5. Since renamed the Department of Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander
Affairs and the Island Board of Industry Services.
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